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IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
F. B. SCHICK and ~iARY EVE 
SCHICK, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
J. H. PERRY and ~1ARIAN PERRY, 
his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
9246 
AP·PELLANT'S' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF F·ACTS 
This is an action brought by plaintiffs (appellants) 
to enforce the provisions of certain subdivision restric-
tions affecting ·Cottonwood Glade Subdivision in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. From a Judgment in favor of de-
fendants (respondents), this appeal is taken. 
On January 3, 1947, Cottonwood Glade Subdivision, 
containing 33 lots, was established by Edward N. Bagley 
and his immediate family. (R. 176-178) (Ex. 3-P) On 
December 26, 1947, the Bagleys recorded "Restrictions 
on ·Cottonwod Glade Subdivision" (Ex. 1-P), which Re-
strictions were to continue in effect for fifteen years and 
contained, among other provisions, the following: 
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"I. Each and every lot above described shall 
be known and is hereby designated as a 'Resi-
dential Lot' and no structure shall be erected, 
altered, placed or permitted to remain on any such 
'Residential Lot' other than one detached single-
family dwelling not to exceed two stories in height 
and a private garage for not more than 3 auto-
mobiles. 
"V. No noxious or offensive trade or activ-
ity shall be carried on upon any residential lot 
hereinabove described or any part or portion 
thereof, nor shall anything be done thereon "\vhich 
may become an annoyance or nuisance to the 
occupants of the remaining residential lots here-
inbefore described. This district is not intended to 
be divided for or used for a commercial area, 
therefore, livestock and fowls for this purpose will 
not be permitted in the area. (This paragraph is 
not intended to restrict the area so as to prohibit 
the raising of fine small birds, fowls, or animals 
as pets or as a special hobby.) However, the 
housing of such pets must be so constructed that 
it will not be unsightly and the number of such 
birds and pets and the housing for them shall be 
approved by the committee." 
On January 19, 1951, appellants purchased Lot 11 of 
the subdivision (Ex. 8) in reliance upon the Restrictions, 
and thereafter construrted a $60,000.00 home on the lot. 
(R. 188) 
On December 30, 1954, in order to extend the exis-
tence of the building co1n1nittee established under Article 
III of the Restrictions, an "Agreement Extending Re-
servations, Restrictions and Covenants" (Ex. 2) was 
signed and recorded on December 31, 1954, naming Ed-
ward N. Bagley, Harold H. Gloe and Glen C. Peglau as 
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committee members to act until January 1, 1965. Sub-
stantially all of the purchasers of lots from the original 
subdividers, including Harold H. Gloe and Olive Gloe, 
predecessors in title of the Perrys (respondents), pur-
ehased their respective properties subject to the Restric-
tions. (R. 184, 185) (Ex. 9) 
Ever since the origin of the restrictions, the com-
Inittee had been in existence according to the testimony 
of respondents' own witnesses. Mr. Bowerbank sought 
permission to build fron1 the Building Co1nmittee on July 
25, 1955, six months after the agreement to extend the 
committee had been executed (Ex. 32). Mr. Peglau, 
named as a committee member, signed the July 25 letter 
granting said permission (Ex. 32). Mr. Hoggan, defend-
ants' 'vitness, asked for permission of the committee to 
build a playhouse (R. 258, 259) and it was granted. Mr. 
Clarence Reese, defendants' witness, had acted on the 
committee in 1958 (R. 270). 
The Perrys acquired Lot 12 from the Gloes on April 
9, 1959 (Ex. 5-P), and soon thereafter, on April 24, 1959 
(Ex. 6-P), sought permission of the building committee 
to construct a three-horse stable and tack room. On May 
4, 1959, permission was denied (Ex. 7 -P) by the building 
committee ( R. 220-221) . 
Nevertheless, shortly thereafter the Perrys began 
construction on the horse barn, a structure 48 feet long 
and about 12 feet wide (R. 222) situate adjacent to ap-
pellants' livingroom and patio (R. 190-199) (Exs. 10, 11 
and 12). Defendants continued construction until en-
joined by a Temporary Injunction issued on June 10, 
1959 (R.3). 
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The matter came on for trial before Judge A. H. 
Ellett (R. 149-171) who ruled in favor of app·ellants 
based upon Paragraph I of the Restrictions (R. 163) and 
ruled that he would grant appellants' Motion for Judg-
ment on the pleadings unless respondents filed amended 
pleadings (R. 170, 171) setting up a defense of estoppel. 
The matter was thereafter pretried and finally came 
on for non-jury trial before the Honorable Joseph G. 
Jeppson on February 2, 1960. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment were entered February 26, 1960. From a Judg-
ment denying plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial and 
Motion to Amend 'Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment (R. 140) and dated March 29, 1960, 
this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
·THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARN WAS PROHIBITED UNDER 
PARAGRAPH I OF THE RESTRICTIONS. 
A. THE INTENT OF THE RESTRICTIONS IS TO PRO-
HIBIT ·CONSTRUCTION OF STRUCTURES SUCH AS 
THE PERRY HORSE BARN OR STABLE. 
B. THE PERRY BARN OR S'TABLE IS A STRUCTURE 
WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF PARAGRAPH I. 
C. THE ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES AND OTHERS 
SUPPORT AN INTERPRE'TATION OF THE RE-
STRICTIONS WHICH PROHIBITS THE CONSTRUC-
TION OF THE BARN OR STABLE. 
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POIN'T II 
TilE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE 
RESTRICTIONS ·CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE PROHIBITED 
THE CONS'TRUCTION OF THE HORSE BARN OR STABLE. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF 'THE BARN WAS PROHIBITED BY 
THE BUILDING COMMITTEE. 
A. THE BUILDING COMMITTEE IS A VALIDLY OR-
GANIZED AND EXISTING COMMITTEE UNDER 
·THE RESTRI·CTIONS. 
B. THE DISAPPROVAL OF THE BUILDING COMMIT-
TEE SHOULD BE DETERMINATIVE OF THE PER-
RYS' RIGHT TO CONSTRUCT THE HORSE BARN. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING AITTORNEYS' 
FEES TO THE DEFENDANTS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARN WAS PROHIBITED UNDER 
PARAGRAPH I OF THE RESTRICTIONS. 
A. 
THE INTENT OF TI-IE RES'TRICTIONS IS TO PRO-
HIBIT ·CONSTRUCTION OF STRUCTURES SUCH AS 
THE PERRY HORSE BARN OR STABLE. 
Paragraph I of the Restrictions (Ex 1-P), provides 
as follows: 
"Each and every lot above described shall be 
knovvn and is hereby designated as a residential 
lot, and no i s~tructure shall be erected, altered, 
placed or permitted to remain in any such resi-
dential lot other than one detached single-family 
dvvelling not to exceed two stories in height and 
a private garage for not more than three auto-
mobiles.'' 
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It is clear that said Paragraph I of the Restrictions, 
having a position of prime importance in the paragraph-
ing establishes the tenor of the Restrictions, to-wit, are-
stricted residential area of fine homes. There are other 
provisions which carry out this pattern of an exclusive 
neighborhood. 
Paragraph III, in part, provides: 
"N·o building shall be erected, placed or al-
tered on any building plot in this subdivision 
until the building plans, specifications and plot 
plat showing the location of such building have 
been approved in writing as to conformity and 
harmony of external design with existing struc-
t . th bd" . . '' ures In e su IVIslon ------------------------· 
Paragraph IV p-rovides, in part, as follows: 
No building shall be located nearer than 45 
feet to the front residential lot line of said Cot-
tonwood Glade Subdivision. . . . No residential 
structure shall be erected or placed on any build-
ing plot, which plot has an area of less than 20,000 
square feet or a width of less than 120 feet at 
the front building set back line.'' 
P·aragraph V provides, in part, as follows: 
''No noxious or offensive trade or activity 
shall be carried on upon any residential lot here-
inbefore described or any part or portion thereof, 
nor shall anything be done thereon which may 
beco1ne an .annoyance or nuisance to the occupants 
of the remaining residential lots hereinbefore de-
scribed. This district is not intended to be divided 
f·or or used for a commercial area, therefore, live-
stock and fowls for this purpose will not be per-
Initted in the area. (This paragraph is not intend-
ed to restrict the area so as to prohibit the raising 
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of fine small birds, fowls, or animals as pets or 
as a special hobby.) H'O\Vever, the housing of such 
pets mu8t be so constructed that it will not be 
unsightly and the number of such birds and pets 
and the house for them shall be approved by the 
committee. ' ' 
Paragraph VIII provides that: 
"No strueture shall be moved onto any resi-
dential lot hereinbefore described or any part 
thereof unless it meets with the approval of the 
committee hereinbefore named, such approval to 
be given in writing. ' ' 
Paragraph XIII provides, in part, that: 
''All eovenants and restrictions herein stated 
and set forth shall run ... until 15 ye.ars from 
the date hereof at which time said covenants and 
restrictions shall automatically be extended for 
successive periods of 10 years unless by a vote of 
the n1ajority of the then owners of said residential 
lots, it is agreed to change the said covenants in 
whole or in part." 
The lots in the Cottonwood Glade Subdivision are 
large lots with beautiful, expensive and elaborately land-
scaped homes situate therein. The Schick house (Ex. 11-P 
and 12-P) is typical of the houses which range in value 
from $25,000.00 to $50,000.00 (R. 187, 204). The sub-
division is just E.ast of Highland Drive along Pheasant 
'V ay and Pheasant Circle and is becoming increasingly 
urban along with the rest of Salt Lake County, there now 
being only 10 vacant lots in the subdivision ou.t of a total 
of 33. (R. 349) (See Ex. 3-P, a plat of the subdivision) 
By reason of the vari'Ous restrictions mentioned 
above and by reason of the type of residential area being 
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developed under the restrictions, we must conclude that 
the subdividers intended Paragraph I to fix the type. of 
structures to be allowed within the framework of the re-
strictions. The first paragraph of the restrictions is ab-
solute, and subsequent paragraphs in the restrictions 
conform to :the intent of Paragraph I, but do not and can-
not in any way derogate from the intent thereof. 
If the Perry horse stable is a structure, then cer-
tainly by no reasonable cons~truction or interpretation of 
Paragraph I, can it he considered a dwelling or garage. 
B 
THE PERRY BARN OR STABLE IS A STRUCTURE 
WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF PARAGRAPH I. 
As defined in Volume 83, C.J.S., at Page 549, 
''The word 'structure' usually refers to a 
permanent stationary erection and ordinarily 
carries with it the idea of size, weight and 
strength .... " 
Recently this Court, in the case of Parrish v. Rich-
ards' 8 u.t. 2d 419, 336 p. 2d 1:22, discussed the interpre-
tation of the word "structure'' in a covenant sin1ilar to 
the restrictions here in issue. I quote the applicable por-
tion of the Court's decision: 
''The covenant in < raestion uses the general 
word 'struetu1·e' ·and then enun1erates garages 
and dwellings. This is the class of structure that 
is being talked about. That is, it is plainly de-
signed to provide against the building of struc-
tures of that kind, sueh as sheds, barns, stores. 
The construction given is in accordance 'vith the 
language of the eovenant. Garages and other 
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similar buildings which are of solid construction 
are of a different character entirely ... " 
The covenant in question in the Parrish case pro-
vided as follows: 
''Use of land: Each lot is hereby design1ated 
as a residential lot and none of the said lots shall 
be improved, used or occupied for other than pri-
vate single family residence purposes, and no flat 
or apartment house ... shall be erected ... other 
than a one, two or three car garage, and one single 
family dwelling, not to exceed one story in height. 
" 
The Cou:flt, in determining what was included under 
the term ''structure'' used the principle ''ejusdem gen-
eris,'' st,ating in effect that where the term "structure'' 
is used follovved by the enumer.ation of the type of dwell-
ing to be allo,ved, that the word "structure'' refers to 
that similar type of structure and prohibits the construc-
tion of such similar types of structures as sheds, barns 
and stores. The use of the word ''structure'' followed by 
a particular enumeration of the types of dwellings to be 
allowed should give the s:ame interpretation to our own 
restrictions as was given to the restrictions in the Parrish 
case. In other words, a barn or stable such as the one 
construcrted by the Perrys would fall in the class of struc-
tures prohibited under Paragraph I. 
·Certainly there can be no question that the contem-
plated barn or stable is a structure. The views from the 
Schick livingroom window (Ex. 11-P) and from the 
Schick patio area (Ex. 12-P) show a very substantial and 
permanent cinder block structure. The building had foot-
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ings !and foundations (R. 324), consisted of three s.talls 
of 12 feet in width each, a hay storage area, and had an 
overall length of 48 feet (R. 221). The building is 12 feet 
wide and will be approximately 8% feet high and covered 
wirth brick (R. 222.) 
The barn or stable is constructed at the rear of the 
Perry's lot and is separate from the Perry's house by a 
horse exercise ring having an approximate diameter of 
100 feet and being built up above ground level about 6 
inches (R. 327-330). The barn or stable is almost adja-
cent to the Schicks' back yard patio area and the exercise 
ring would, -of course, be almost opp'Osite the livingroom 
area of the Schi·ck home (R. 192-194) (Ex. 10-P). 
It is difficult to imagine any structure which more 
cle.arly viol;ates the intent to maintain an exclusive and 
beautiful residential area than does this large barn with 
its •attendant horse exercis·e ring and other facilities. It 
is likewise difficult to conceive of a structure more ob-
jectionable in its use and in its location with reference to 
the Schick home than is this horse harn or stable. As a 
corollary to the above statements, there can be a no more 
reasonable interpretati'On of the restrictions than an in-
terpretation e:x:cluding the construction of a substantial 
and permanent horse barn in such a restricted residential 
are'a. 
c 
THE ACTIONS OF THE PARTIES AND OTHERS 
SUPPORT AN INTERPRE'TATION OF THE RE-
STRICTIONS WHICH PROHIBITS THE CONSTRUC-
TION OF THE BARN OR STABLE. 
10 
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Although defend1ant Perrys now raise a doubt as to 
the interpretation of P·aragraph I, there seemed to have 
been no doubt in their minds at the time they C'Ommenced 
construction of the barn. The Perrys wrote a letter to the 
building committee (Ex. 6-P), in which permission w.as 
requested to build this stable. This permission, of course, 
was denied by the building committee by a letter (Ex. 
7-P) signed by Edward Bagley. 
Through·out the evidence, the Perrys attempted to 
show sheds and barns constructed here and there 
throughout :the subdivision. Actually there is no com-
parison between the permanent Perry barn and these 
other one or two temporary buildings or sheds. Further-
more, subdivision owners constructing these sm1all sheds 
recognized the prohibition against constructing any 
building on the l~ots without the approval of the building 
committee, by first obtaining approval of the committee. 
Mr. Bowerbank likewise recognized the prohibition 
against structures by ,asking permission to construct a 
shelter or shed on his property (Ex. 32-D). Mr. John F. 
Hogan also recognized the prohibition against certain 
structures by asking permission to move onto his prop-
erty a eertain small childrens' playhouse (R. 258, 259). 
All of these people were witnesses called by the Perrys. 
POINIT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE 
RESTRICTIONS ·CONSIDERED AS A WHOLE PROHIBITED 
THE CONS'TRUCTION OF THE HORSE BARN OR STABLE. 
The Court concluded in Paragraph II of the Con-
clusions of Law (R. 132) that the restrictions permitted 
11 
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the erection of housing sufficient to accommodate the 
Perrys' three horses. This conclusion is bras.ed upon the 
provisions of Paragraph V of the restrictions. Said con-
clusion, however, is in error for the f·ollowing reasons: 
1. Paragraph V of the restrictions describes and 
limits the activities which can be performed in the resi-
dential subdivision. Its primary purpose has to do with 
activity 1and usage of the land rather than wi·th the type 
of structure allowed thereon. Paragraph I, however, 
establishes the type of structure to be allowed. As h~as 
been indicated in the ease of Granger v. Boulls (Wash.) 
152 P. 2d 325, 155 A.L.R. 523, the specific type of struc-
ture provided for cannot be changed or modified by a 
subsequent provision in the restrictions rel~ating to the 
use of the prop·erty. The Court says: 
"Undoubtedly the covenants in the instant 
case were for the purpose of segregating the l~and 
into a private residential district. That it failed to 
restrict the use of the land itself for farming is 
clear, but it is equally cle,ar that it did p~rohibit 
the use of farm buildings as distinguished from 
private dwellings.'' 
In this law suit, we .are eoncerned \vith the type of 
structure which has been con1menced by the Perrys and 
we are seeking to enjoin the construction of a barn or 
stable and not the use of the yard for n1aintenance of 
the Perrys' three horses. Therefore,, of prime concern in 
the interpret-ation of these restrictions is the type of 
structure allowed under P'aragr;aph I. That type of struc-
ture cannot be extended to include structures, such as 
pennanent horse s~tables, which might conceivably be 
necessary or incident to ;the use of th.e residentirallot for 
12 
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the eare of horses. Paragraph I is an absolute pro-
hibition against the construction of the barn. Any hous-
ing \vhich 1nay be allowed in connecti'On with the activity 
to be conducted on the prop.erty, must be within the in-
tent of Paragraph I of the restrictions . Although Para-
graph V permits housing, if ap·proved by the committee, 
the committee is not given the permissi'On to go beyond 
the provisions of Paragra.p·h I in the approval of any 
housing. The committee certainly cannot approve a 
structure which is prohibited under Paragraph I. 
2. What effect should he given to the phrase 1n 
Paragraph V, "fine small birds, fowls, or animals as pets 
or as a special hobby"~ The Court has in its Findings, 
determined that the Perrys' horses ·are pets within this 
provision (R. 131, Par. 6), and, therefore, housing for 
these animals is allowed. Appellants cannot ·agree with 
such ~an interpretation which places horses within the 
category of "fine small birds, fowls, or animals." Cer-
tainly a horse is not a fine small animal, there being no 
larger animal which might conceivably be kept on these 
subdivision lots. If we were to believe that a horse did fit 
in an .animal category under said phrase, then we would 
htave to limit the applieability of the words, "fine small" 
to the "\Viord "birds" only. It is, of course, absurd to so 
di,stinguish between small and large birds without at the 
same time distinguishing between small and large fowls 
and small and large animals. Thus ''fine sm:a.Il'' must 
refer not only to birds, but also to fowls and animals. 
This interpretation is, of course, consistent with the pur-
pose and intent of maint·aining fine residential homes in 
the subdivision. Therefore, we 0an only conclude that if 
13 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
there is any exclusion from the usages prohibited under 
P·ar.agraph V, the raising of horses is not so excluded. 
The housing for h·orses regardless of its typ·e is not per-
mitted under these restrictions and it matters not what 
the status of the committee might be. 
3. In bringing the construction of the horse stable 
under the exclusionary language of Paragraph V, the 
court has held that the horses kept by the Perrys are pets 
and that no part of the use of the horses is intended to be 
commercial. (R. 131, Par. 6) (R. 141, Par. 2(b)) The 
evidence clearly shows that the Perrys were not keep-
ing the horses ias pets, but were engaged in an extensive 
horse raising and horse sho\ving endeavor. (R. 223) 
They bought and sold horses each year and actually had 
pu:vchased 15 brood mares in November of 1959 in order 
to :vaise horses for sale on their Nevada ranch. (R. 224) 
The Perrys travel extensively to most of the Western 
states for the various horse sho,vs and very often sell 
their horses after a successful showing. (R. 225, 226) 
This type of program, including extensive showing, 
buying and selling and traveling with the horses, and 
further including 1a p·ermanent horse stable and large 
exercise ring, hardly seems compatible with the theory 
of keeping of horses as pets. Such evidence cannot sup-
port the Court's finding of fact (R. 131), th~at these 
horses are pets or are not used in a commercial endeavor, 
notwithstanding Mr. Perry's repe~ated claims that this 
was just a hobhy. If it conreiv.ably "'"as a hobby, it seems 
to have been a profitable one to s:ay the least. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE 
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CONSTRUCTION OF THE BARN WAS PROHIBITED BY 
THE BUILDING COMMITTEE. 
Notwithstanding the unequivocal provisions of Para-
graph I of the Restrictions, and notwithstanding the 
other provisions of the Restrictions discussed above, and 
assuming the Court finds it necessary to look even fur-
ther into the existence 'and powers enjoyed by the build-
ing committee, the authority of the committee and the 
provisions of the Re,strictions as well as the activities of 
the committee should be examined, particularly in view 
of the fact th·at the committee refused to approve the 
construction of the Perrys' barn. (Exs. 6-P and 7-P) (R. 
220,221) 
A 
THE BUILDING COMMITTEE IS A VALIDLY OR .. 
GANIZED AND EXISTING COMMITTEE UNDER 
·THE RESTRI·CTIONS. 
Paragraph III provides for the approval by a com-
mittee of the plans, specifications and plot plans for any 
building erected, placed or altered in the subdivision. 
Paragraph III further provides that the approval of the 
committee was not required .after January 1, 1955, unle8s 
an instrument ''executed by the then record owners of a 
majority of the lots in the subdivision" (Ex. 1-P) was 
duly executed ·and recorded prior to January 1, 1955 (Ex. 
2-P). 
Paragraph III does require th·at the record owners 
of a majority of the 32 lots (Lots 1-27 and 29-33) (Ex. 
3-P) execute this extension agreement in order to extend 
the 1authority of the committee past January 1, 1955. Ex-
hibit 3-P, the plat of the subdivision, shows the record 
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owners as of December 30, 1954 and Exhibit 2-P, the ex-
tension agreement, shows the number ·of signatures of 
the record owners of 17 lots. of the subdivision. These lots 
are Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 24, 25, 26, 30, 31, 32 
and 33. Thus a majority of the lots are represented by 
signatures of the record owners. H'Owever, the ·Court 
found (P.ar. 2, R. 130) that a majority of the lot owners 
h!ad not signe·d said .agreement, apparently on the reason-
ing th~at only Harold H. GlO'e signed for !tot 12 and only 
.Ar.thur Pratt signed for lot 8. The wives of the latter two 
owners did not sign. 
Appellants contend that the Court erred in making 
such a finding .and further contend that the committee 
was duly constituted and extended, upon the follo\\ring 
grounds: 
1. The p·eople who signed the extension agreement 
recorded it December 31, 1954, apparently believing and 
intending that the extension agreement had been properly 
executed and that it hrud the necessary signatures, includ-
ing the sign,atures for lots 8 and 12. 
2. Even though the wives of Harold Gloe and 
Arthur Pratt did not sign the extension agreement, such 
a defect, if it be .one, is not of sufficient importance to 
nullify the effect of this agreen1ent and to render it void. 
After all, this extension agreement is not a conveyance 
of property and thus the technicality of conveyancing 
need not be followed. Our Supreme Court, in the ca.se of 
In Re: Smithfield City, 70 Utah 564, in discussing the 
neees~ity of legal and technical eo1nplianee 'vith owner-
ship lav\T in the signing of a petition, held that the o'vner-
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ship conte1nplated was the equitable and P'OSsessory own-
ership rather than the technical leg.al title. The Court 
~aid: 
"In every case where construction is neces-
sary t~o determine the sense in which the word is 
used, the object sought to be reached in the statute 
is the most i1nportant consideration .... Many 
authorities to the same general effect .are cited in 
the annotated case reported in 2 A.L.R .. , pages 
778 to 804, and while not entirely agreed, we think 
that the weight of authority and the better reason-
ing defines the word 'ownership' as used in 
statutes similar to the one here involved as pro-
prietorship in or dominion over the propeTty, 
rather than mere legal title without either pro-
prietorship or dominion. 
"Titles are not determined, nor are they in 
any wise affected by proceedings such as this one. 
Choice of the form ·of local government alone is 
. l d " 1nvo ve .... 
Therefore, it can hardly be said in this case that the 
signature of either Mrs. Pratt or Mrs. Gloe was neces-
sary to validate this extension agreement, \vhen all per-
sons concerned accepted the agreement as having been 
executed and by their actions approved and ratified the 
agreement. 
3. M-r. H.arold Gloe, who did sign and who was ap-
pointed to and acted on the building committee (Ex. 2-P), 
was the predecessor in title of the Perrys and sold lot 12 
to the Perrys April 9, 1959. (Ex. 5-P) Certainly it is rea-
sonable to hold the Perrys to the same restriction t:o 
which their predecessor Gloe was held. Paragraph XIII 
of the restrictions so provides. The Perrys are the first 
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people in the subdivision to atte·mpt to disavow the exis-
tence of the building committee. 
4. From the evidence, it appears that all concerned, 
including the Perrys, recognized the existence of the 
committee from January 1, 1955 on to the pres.ent time: 
(a) First and foremost, the Perrys themselves 
·considered the committee of good standing. They be-
lieved it was necessary to obtain the committee's 
app-roval for the construction of their barn and only 
after having the committee refuse to approve the 
barn, did the Perrys apparently decide to ignore the 
committee and proceed without the necessary ap-
proval. (Ex. 6-P and 7-P) 
(b) Mr. William Bo\verbank \Yas called by the 
Perrys as perhap.s their chief witness and he testified 
at length concerning his dealings with the new com-
mittee as it had been reractivated after January 1, 
1955 (R. 234, 235). Particularly, Mr. Bower bank testi-
fied regarding his application to the committee and 
to MT. Glen Peglau (Ex. 32-D), wherein Mr. Bower-
bank sought ~approval of the ~construction of a shed 
and of a circular tank. This request was made 
July 25, 1955 after the co1n1nittee had been reacti-
vated by the extension agreement. It should be 
noted that the application of Mr. Bowerb~ank was 
supposedly approved by 1\tir. Peglau, acting as one 
of the con1mittee mernbers. It should also be noted 
that Mr. Bovverbank ""'as one of the lot owners shown 
on Exhibit 3-P as of Decen1ber 30, 1954, and " .. e must 
assun1e b~r his actions and testimony that he ratified 
the execution of the agreernent by reason of his 
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recognition of the com1nittee in July of 1955. 
(c) Mr. Glen C. PHglau, another of the Perrys' 
witnesses who was named on the extension agree-
mHnt as a committee member, (R. 286) testified thaJt 
he was an active member of the building committee 
subsequent to January 1, 1955. 
(d) Clarence W. Ree.se, still another of the 
Perrys' witnesses, and the owner of lot 4 of 'the sub-
division, as shown on Exhibit 3-P, also testified that 
he had been elected a member of the building com-
mittee in 1958 (R. 270). Thus WH have still another 
record owner who r'atified the execution of the exten-
sion agreement. 
(e) Mr. John T. Hogan, still another witness 
of the Perrys and also a lot owner in the subdivision 
testified that he had obtained in 1955 approval of the 
committee for the construction of a small childrens' 
playhouse at the re'ar of his p·roperty (R .. 259). 
All of the foregoing evidence and the admissions of 
the Perrys clearly indicate that the people in the subdivi-
sion recognized thaJt the building committee had been con-
tinued past January 1, 1955 and further shows th'at 
everyone relied upon the existence of the committee ij ~ 
seeking approval of various plans and specifications for 
different types of small sheds and buildings to be placed 
upon their respective properties. There is no evidence to 
the contrary and there surely is no evidence to indicate 
that the committee had not been properly extended, ex-
cept the absence of the signaJtures of the two wives which 
are mentioned above. 
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Therefore, the court should have found that the com-
mittee's existence was extended past January 1955 and 
th~at it was a duly constituted .and effective eommittee at 
the time the Perrys sought approval for the horse barn. 
B. 
THE DISAPPROVAL OF THE BUILDING COMMIT-
TEE SHOULD BE DETERMINATIVE OF THE PER-
RY'S RIGHT TO CONSTRUCT THE HORSE BARN. 
If v1e assume, as we are in this argument under this 
particular p·oint that the approval of the eommi,ttee is the 
only basis for prohibiting the construction of the barn, 
then having determined that the committee was a valid 
commi,ttee, it follows by reason of the restrictions that 
the disapprov.al of the eommittee would prevent the Per-
rys from constructing the barn. See Harmon v. Burow, 
106 At. 310; Hannula v. Hacienda Homes, 211 P. 2d 302, 
('Calif.) 19 A.L.R. 2.d 1268; Kirkley v. Seipelt, 128 At. 2d 
430, and Stanford v. Brooks, 298 S.W. 2d 268. 
The approval, however, required of the committee 
c.annot and should no1t transcend the requirements set 
forth in Paragraph 1 of the restrictions. In other words, 
the appr·oval referred to still must apply to structures 
within the scope of Paragraph I. Absent any such ap-
proval, Paragraph I 1nust still be given the in1port \Yhich 
follo\vs fro1n jts position as the para1nount covenant in 
these restrictions. The approval \Yithin the com1nittee's 
authority relates to the housing for pets and said hous-
ing must still come \vi thin the restrictions of Paragraph I. 
There can he no question but that the construction of 
a barn and the use of the barn \vould be detrin1en~tal to 
the Schick~ in this ·ca.se and there ran be no question but 
th~at the disapproval of the conunittee \v.as reasonable. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING A'TTORNEYS' 
FEES TO THE DEFENDANTS. 
Injunction cases such as the subject one are one of the 
few clas.ses of li1tigation in which attorneys' fees are al-
lowed as da1nages. In this type of case, there is a very 
narrow rule which h'a.s been quite uniformly established 
by our courts to the effect that where attorneys' fees are 
all·owed as damages, they can only be fees incurred for 
services rendered in obtaining the disolution of the in-
junction. In 28 Am. Jttr., Par. 347 (1959 Vol.) the rule is 
stated thusly: 
"Under this view it is incumbent on the party 
claiming damages to show either that the injunC-
tion was the sole relief to which the suit pertained 
or that the fees and expenses were paid out solely 
for the purpose of securing the dissolution uf the 
injunction as distinguished from expenditures 
for the hearing of the principle issues in the 
case.'' (numerous cases cited in support thereof) 
See also McDe.rmott v. Amerkan Bonding Company of 
Baltimore, 179 P. 828 (Montana) and United Sta.tes Fi-
delity and Guaranty Co1npany v. Frohmiller, 227 P. 2d 
1007. 
The testimony of Mr. Richards, one of the attorneys 
for the defendants, indicates ~as a basis for the attorneys' 
fee charged, the expenditures of 92 hours outside of court 
and 7 days in court on v.arious Motions, Pre-trials and 
trials. (R. 343, 344) However, many of these hours and 
several days in court were expended in connection with 
a third-party aCJtion brought by the defendants against 
Harold and Olive Gloe, which ruction was ultimately dis-
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missed. The various pleadings indicate that there must 
have been a substantial number of hours and days ex-
pended which did not rel·ate to the dissolution of the in-
jun0tion. The defendants' third-party claim appears at 
page 38 of the Record; defendants' Motion and Notice 
relating thereto ap·pear at page 43, 47 of the Record; the 
third-party Motion to Dismiss appears at page 77 of the 
Record, the defendants' Notice of Deposition of the third-
party defendants app·ears at page 86 of the Record; a 
further Pre-Trial at which the Third-Party Complaint 
was argue.d appe.ars at page 88 and further argument in 
connection with the third-party defendants appears at 
pages 94 and 95 of the Record. 
No where is there any evidence by the defendants nor 
is there any finding by this court showing what part of 
the leg.al services relruted entirely to the dissolution of the 
injunction. ·The evidence indicates a flat total number of 
hours and a total number of days covering all matters re-
lating to the litigation. This failure to segregate the a~­
torneys' fees is f.atal to the defendants' recovery of said 
fees as da1nages and the court's Findings and Conclusions 
in this respect are in error. 
SUMMARY 
The ·Schicks purchased their lolt in 1949 and there-
after built a $60,000.00 house in the very exclusive Cot-
tonwood Glade Subdivision in reliance upon the sanctity 
of the restrictive covenants. After several ye.ars, consi-
derable effort and a substantial invest1nent, the Schicks 
now have a very beautifully landscaped hon1e, as do many 
others in Cotton"\Yood Glade Subdivision. By reason of 
the construction of the horse barn or stable just across 
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the property line from their patio and living area, the 
Sehicks are now faced with the degrading prospects of 
forever looking out of their large glass walled livingroom 
and from their patio into the Perrys' large horse barn 
with all of its attendant unpleasantries. This surely is 
not the type of protection contemplated under these re-
strictions and particularly under Paragraph I thereof. 
Judge Elletlt, at the first trial of this matter, very 
clearly held that Paragraph I prohibited the construction 
of the barn (R. 162, 163, 166, 167 and 169), but at the 
same time indicated that there might be a factual issue 
relaJting to estoppel. The defendants were then allowed 
to amend their pleadings so as to raise this defense and 
the trial "\Vas set over for this re.ason. The second trial 
was had and Judge Jep·pson ruled that there was no es-
toppel (R. 108) but at the same time found contrary ~o 
Judge Ellett's ruling, that the restrictions did not p·ro-
hibit the construction of the h·orse b.arn. The defendants, 
therefore, were given two opportunities for an interpre-
tation of the restrictions to be given in their favor. The 
first interpretation by Judge Ellett would seem to be the 
correct one. 
If non-conforming structures such as this horse barn 
are permitted under the guise of ''housing for animals,'' 
then Paragraph I of the restrictions has absolutely no 
purpose. It is axiomatic that docun1ents, inc] uding re-
strictive covenants, are construed by giving proper 
weight to the various portions thereof and it is only coln-
mon sense to reason thaJt Paragraph I was placed in these 
restrictions for the purp·ose of establishing the type of 
structures to be allowed on these subdivision lots. 
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Going beyond Paragraph I and into the other provi-
sions of the restrictions, it is difficult to understand why 
the committee can he so completely byp~assed as it has 
be·en by the trial court. If nothing else, the committee, 
by its letter to 'the Perrys (Ex. 7 and 8) represented a 
current 'eonstruction and interpretation of th·e effect of 
Paragraph I. This letter signed by J\{r. Bagley, certainly 
represents the thinking of lthe man who originally sub-
divided the ground and who originally filed the restrie-
tions. He said : 
"Under the building restrictions coveTing the 
Cottonwood Glade Subdivision, the housing of 
horses is nolt allowed and the buildng com1nittee 
has no power to authorize the construction of 
barns as requested in y'our letter of April 24th." 
Whether based upon Paragraph I alone, or upon all 
of the covenants, or upon the functions and powers of the 
committee, it seems inescapable that a large permanent 
horse barn or stable has no place in this exclusive resi-
dential subdivision and that its construction is a violation 
of the subdivision restrictions. 
WHEREFORE, appellants respectfully pray tha:t 
this Honorable Court reverse the decision of the trial 
court and make permanent the temporary injunction 
heretofore issued. 
Re-spectfully submitted, 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
BY 
Elliott Lee Pratt 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
351 South State Street 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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